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BUILDING CAPACITY THROUGH COOPERATION
Remarks delivered as a luncheon address to the International Seapower
Symposium at the Naval War College on 21 September 2005, by
Ambassador Rose M. Likins
Iam delighted to have this opportunity to speak to such a distinguished audienceon the issue of maritime security and to share some thoughts with you about the
State Department in general and about how it supports and contributes to your
efforts in developing this “Global Network of Maritime Nations” that the sym-
posium has gathered to address. My purpose is to talk about global alliances, in
this case the U.S. Navy and allied and coalition navies, and to offer a series of rec-
ommendations that you may want to consider.
The core mission of the State Department is to “create a more secure, demo-
cratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the inter-
national community.” Our bilateral and multilateral relationships are integral to
that mission—and many of those relationships are underpinned by strategic
military alliances. One of our principal undertakings in executing this mission is
building coalitions or partnerships to resolve shared problems, whether those
problems are security-related, like the threats of terrorism or weapons of mass
destruction, or more social and developmental issues like HIV/AIDS and traf-
ficking in persons or building a community of democracy.
Despite the “discovery” of the phenomenon of globalization over the last sev-
eral years, it has long been my belief that mariners were the first agents of global-
ization centuries ago, and that our planet’s oceans were the first global commons.
We tend to use that term today to refer to space, to the Internet, to the air we
breathe, but in fact our oceans and seas were where it all started. Those who ven-
tured out onto them—whether motivated by the thrill of discovery, the search for
riches, routine commerce, or communications—were the pioneers in creating the
ties that bind us. Mariners from all corners of the globe quickly discovered that
they faced common challenges and threats and developed a series of traditions
and working procedures that superseded national boundaries. The imperative to
rescue fellow sailors in times of distress, to mark hazards to navigation, to share
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food and water with those whose vessels are disabled, and share common signal-
ing methods are but a few examples of these maritime practices.
Today, we again face common threats and challenges in the maritime domain,
and it is time for us to strive for shared methods and techniques for defeating
those threats. Those threats include use of our waters for illegal activities like
narcotics trafficking or trafficking in persons, unauthorized exploitation of na-
tional resources, and contamination of the environment. We all face constrained
resources, and our national leaders are called upon to use those scarce resources
to respond to a variety of national needs, from education to public infrastruc-
ture to national defense. We can all maximize the use of these resources by
avoiding duplication of effort and cooperating to confront these common
challenges.
It’s not always easy. There are a multitude of obstacles ranging from the most
basic, like communicating across language barriers or on different communica-
tions networks, to insufficient resources allocated to this mission, to the more
complicated, like historic regional tensions over sovereignty. Together we can
overcome many, if not all, of these obstacles. But we have to want to do that. It
takes a conscious decision to work together.
Language and communications barriers can be overcome with technology
and training. Resource constraints can be minimized by sharing missions and
with the assistance of allies. Sovereignty, in contrast, is perhaps the most difficult
obstacle, because nationalism appeals to strong emotions in every one of us. But
we need to remember that “bad actors” violate our sovereignty every day, caus-
ing enormous social and economic damage. They consciously exploit political
tensions for their own ends. How many of you have seen a vessel suspected of
carrying illicit cargo or conducting illegal operations duck into the waters of an-
other nation when it detects the approach of your own law-enforcement vessel?
It literally happens every day.
Let me be clear. I am not advocating dismantling borders. We have a saying in
the United States, “Good fences make good neighbors,” and there is truth to that
in many circumstances. What I am advocating is that we be more creative than
the bad actors, that we find ways to cooperate by sharing information, commu-
nicating clearly, pooling our resources, and resolving to deny our respective na-
tional territories to our common enemies.
This may sound easy. We all know it’s not. But what the United States is offer-
ing you here today is a hand extended to begin the journey.
In his 2002 National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush stated, “The
greatest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technol-
ogy. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.
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The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.” That statement could
not have been any truer then than it is today. In numerous subsequent fora, Pres-
ident Bush highlighted the need for creating new and reinforcing existing alli-
ances and partnerships to engage in the struggle against the ideology of tyranny
and terror. He and other like-minded leaders have emphasized that to confront
the challenges of this malevolent entity, nations must come together to create a
global vision, with a global boldness of thought and the courage to act.
Incidents at sea involving state-sponsored proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and non-state-sponsored acts of piracy on the high seas and the
littorals require us all, as free nations, to rethink our maritime strategies. The
blurring of the lines between the illegal act of piracy and the illicit acts of prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, not to mention narcotics trafficking
and poaching on fishing grounds, demands that we look beyond our own terri-
torial borders to find a solution to the malfeasant threats to our individual and
collective national security.
The sea lines of communication are the life blood of the world’s commerce.
Despite technology, more than 80 percent of global trade still moves by sea, and
our economies depend on the free and unimpeded movement of its share of that
commerce. Further, with their emerging power-projection land forces and
seemingly unending commitments, the United States and its allies depend on
access to the seas to ensure their security.
Freedom of access now means more than just maritime supremacy but the
awareness and control of the entire spectrum of the maritime domain as well.
The concept of unimpeded sea lines of communication underpins the very
meaning of an effective national security strategy—a strategy primarily based
on global enlargement and global engagement.
During the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts, more than 121 countries
and thirteen international organizations stepped forward and offered their as-
sistance to the United States. These offers ranged from humanitarian assistance
and relief, rescue and salvage operations, and civil engineering assistance, to in-
frastructure repair and medical support, to name a few. The cornerstone of facil-
itating, coordinating, and implementing that support came from U.S. and
foreign naval assets. Quickly assembling and operating at sea, the U.S. Navy put
together a critical and complex sea-based command, control, and communica-
tions network to coordinate sea, land, and air resources to contain the effects
and begin restoration operations. The seemingly seamless coordination of effort
and ability to integrate civil and foreign capabilities underscored the maritime
component’s innate ability to operate at sea under the most challenging condi-
tions. Without question, had it not been for the rapid response and presence
of those navies, especially the Canadian, Dutch, and Mexican, the disaster would
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have been much worse and the number of casualties would have been signifi-
cantly higher.
I mention this effort not just to pat you all on the back but to highlight the im-
portance and universality of global international maritime cooperation. As in
the 2005 tsunami recovery efforts, because of your maritime assets and capabili-
ties the global community was able to operate at sea when land-based assets
could not. That same type of coordinated, integrated, and interoperable net-
working is needed on a broader scale to deliver the capability that the Chief of
Naval Operations proposes at this conference.
So, what is the United States doing to support this effort?
First of all, the president emphasized the criticality of maritime domain
awareness in a speech in January 2002. During that speech, he stated, “The heart
of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extend-
ing well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries.” Remaining true to his
2002 comments, he recently signed a critical piece of legislation—National
Strategy for Maritime Security—that underscores the importance of securing
the maritime domain.
Although the strategy highlights the need for national efforts, it also strongly
emphasizes the vital importance of coordinating with foreign governments and
international organizations and of soliciting international support for enhanced
maritime security. Within the strategy, the president stressed the need to de-
velop an overarching plan that addresses all of the components of the maritime
domain—domestic, international, public, and private—a global, cross-discipline
approach to the maritime domain centered on a layered, defense-in-depth
framework.
When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice began her tenure, she challenged
all of us in the State Department to transform the way we think about diplomacy
and to consider how we might best use our diplomatic tools to target better our
responses to meet today’s threats, not the threats of yesterday. As Secretary Rice
told the department in her first “town hall” meeting, “Transformational diplo-
macy is not easy. It means taking on new tasks, breaking old habits, working with
people who are also trying to make those transformations themselves, and being
partners with those around the world who share our values and want to improve
their lives.” She was right. Diplomatic efforts dealing with the issues of
counterproliferation and conventional military threats have very little resem-
blance to those of the past. During the Cold War era, we had the luxury of time
to deliberate and debate foreign policy and develop foreign-policy-related mea-
sures. Those days are past.
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Today, we as diplomats and senior military planners must primarily work to
build a sound and enduring basis of support to coordinate and respond rapidly
when actionable proliferation-related intelligence and law enforcement infor-
mation becomes available, and we must be prepared to adapt and change when
the situation demands.
During a time of constrained resources, the United States realizes that not all
nations can readily invest capital—human, intellect, and financial—in the con-
cepts required to deliver the required capabilities. That is why the United States
remains committed to key military foreign assistance programs—International
Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and the Peace-
keeping Operations Account. In 2001 the United States contributed over $3.75
billion to 114 countries, and in 2004 it contributed over five billion dollars to
over 140 countries in these three programs alone.
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a
low-cost, high-yield, effective component of U.S. security assistance, provides
training on a grant basis to students from over 140 allied and friendly nations.
IMET not only furthers American national interest but advances international
interest by establishing beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate
in increased understanding and defense cooperation.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) advances regional stability through coali-
tion partners that are equipped and trained to achieve common security goals.
Funds provided through this program enable our international partners to im-
prove their military capabilities. Related to but distinct from FMF is the Foreign
Military Sales Program (FMS). FMS is the system that manages government-
to-government military equipment sales. Although many countries provide
their own financing for purchases through the FMS system, the FMF program
provides grants for acquisition.
Finally, but not least, there is the Peacekeeping Operations Account (PKO).
These funds support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations
that are not funded through the United Nations. They help to support regional
peace-support operations for which neighboring countries take primary re-
sponsibility. PKO is also used to enhance and develop peacekeeping capability so
countries are better able to undertake these operations. We are proud to be able
to empower regional leaders to act on behalf of their neighbors in providing sta-
bility within their perspective regions.
In allocating these resources, we place a premium on the wise use of resources
and willingness to engage. In other words, we are willing to help those who help
themselves.
What are the challenges for you that lie ahead?
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First, you must continue to make a strong case to your leaders to invest the re-
sources and cooperate in regional security initiatives. This includes programs,
operations, and exercises. Programs such as the Regional Maritime Security Co-
operation (RMSC) initiative, previously known as the Regional Maritime Secu-
rity Initiative (RMSI), are excellent examples of countries developing initiatives
and programs to counter specific threats within their regions. The RMSC pro-
tects the critical choke points within the Malacca Strait and its littorals, through
which more than half the world’s oil and a third of the world’s trade pass.
On a broader scale, the Proliferations Security Initiative (PSI) is a prime ex-
ample of multinational initiatives to combat global threats. I know that Admiral
Mullen mentioned PSI during his remarks at this symposium, but allow me to
echo his sentiment on this critical initiative that addresses trafficking of WMD
and their means of delivery by sea, land, and air. “The WMD proliferation land-
scape,” he told us, “is dynamic and flexible.” Our response to the threat must also
be flexible, adaptive, and evolutionary so as not only to keep pace but to outpace
those desiring and attempting to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The
Proliferation Security Initiative is unique in that it taps into each participant’s
national authorities and capabilities to create a global web of actions against the
traffic in WMD. PSI has fostered, globally, a basis for practical steps to quickly re-
spond when we or our partners obtain information of proliferation shipments.
The impact of states working together in a deliberately cooperative manner is far
greater than that of states acting alone. Currently, more than sixty states have in-
dicated support for the Proliferation Security Initiative—and we encourage oth-
ers to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles that creates the
framework for PSI action.
In summary, let me say that harnessing the power of the international com-
munity in ways that are in the interests of individual nations, will not be an easy
task, especially given other competing domestic and national interests. That is
why I hope that when you leave this symposium you will feel empowered to re-
turn to your leaders and emphasize how critical this collaboration is for the fu-
ture of all nations. It is also imperative that you engage to the maximum extent
possible in those initiatives within your regions that support global stability by
participating in, and if necessary hosting, regional talks, exercises, and opera-
tions like those previously mentioned. Finally, I encourage you to maintain an
open dialogue with your counterparts here today and to encourage your govern-
ments to do the same, particularly in their efforts to build international outreach
programs for partnering with the global community. As you grapple with the is-
sues of how to promote naval collaboration, build a common picture of mari-
time activity, and define the required maritime security capabilities, I hope you
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will find that this event has reinforced the commitment of the United States to
assisting you.
Let me close with a statement by our previous secretary of state, retired Gen-
eral Colin Powell, one that sums up the situation that we find ourselves facing:
There is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have become the
motive force for freedom and democracy in the world. And there is no country in the
world that does not touch us. We are a country of countries with a citizen in our
ranks from every land. We are attached by a thousand cords to the world at large, to
its teeming cities, to its remotest regions, to its oldest civilizations, to its newest cries
for freedom. This means that we have an interest in every place on this earth; that we
need to lead, to guide, to help in every country that has a desire to be free, open and
prosperous.
AMBASSADOR ROSE M. LIKINS
Ambassador Likins was appointed Acting Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs,
U.S. State Department, on 20 January 2005.
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